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"RIGHT TO DIE" CASES: A MODEL FOR
JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING?
By William L. Webster'
A State Supreme Court rules that a trial court should
have granted a doctor's motion to dismiss a malpractice action
based upon the doctor's negligent failure to diagnose the
patient's condition. The court rules that the patient's death
was due to the disease from which he was suffering and not
the doctor's failure to diagnose or treat it.' The wife of an
incompetent inmate awaiting execution on death row sues her
husband's lawyer to enjoin him from filing any further appeals,
because the effect of the appeals could only be to set aside
the death penalty and leave her husband facing a term of life
imprisonment. Prior to becoming incompetent, her husband
had told her that he preferred death to life in prison. The
court grants the injunction, holding that the right to waive the
right to appeal is an important personal right of the inmate
which cannot be lost by reason of his incompetency. In order
to prevent destruction of the right, his wife must be allowed
to exercise it based upon her assessment as to what decision
* Attorney General of Missouri (1984-Present); 1975, University of Kansas; J.D., 1978,
University of Missouri - Kansas City. Admitted to practice before the United States Supreme
Court. The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Robert L. Presson, Esq., in the
preparation of this article. Robert L. Presson, Assistant Attorney General (1973-present);
A.B., 1970, University of Missouri - Columbia; J.D., 1973, University of Missouri - Columbia.
Admitted to practice before the United States Supreme Court.
1. Cf. In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 955-56 (Me. 1987); see infra note 8. Rasmussen
v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 216-18, 741 P.2d 674, 685 (1987) (70 year old woman in nursing
home kept alive by naso-gastric tube. The Supreme Court of Arizona agreed to decide the
case, even though the patient had died. Id. at 222. The court held that the right to refuse
medical treatment fell into the "zone of privacy" in both the federal and state constitutions.
Id. at 219. Because the patient was not competent to express her wishes, the court relying on
the doctrine of substituted judgment, held that the guardian could decide, based on the
patient's best interests. Id. at 221; In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 341, 486 A.2d 1209, 1226
(1985) (84 year old woman in chronic vegetative state who also died during the litigation.
Id. at 341, 486 A.2d at 1219. She was kept alive by a naso-gastric tube. Id. at 336, 486 A.2d
at 1216. The N.J. Supreme Court held, that under certain conditions, the tube could be
removed by the guardian. Id. at 360-61, 486 A.2d at 1229).
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he would want made.2
An individual now in a nursing home in a persistent
vegetative state had not, prior to his incompetency, made a
will. His family members write a will in his behalf based upon
their assessment as to how he would want to dispose of his
property. Following his death, the will is submitted to the
probate court which accepts it as valid.'
A quadriplegic is subpoenaed to appear as a witness.
When he fails to appear, the court issues a contempt citation.
His lawyer argues that his client's failure to appear was not
the result of any intent to disobey the subpoena but because
of his inability to walk. The court not only agrees that there
is no specific intent to disobey the court order but finds that
he is merely exercising his fundamental liberty interest not to
be required to use a wheelchair.4
The above cases did not happen. The citations given
are real enough but the principles those cases announce have
been applied to new factual circumstances. In the real cases
the Maine, Arizona and New Jersey Supreme Courts held that
withdrawing treatment which would have sustained the life of
a patient is not the cause of death; rather, it was caused by
each patient's underlying condition.' The New Jersey Supreme
Court also held that the right to make medical treatment
decisions cannot be lost by reason of the fact that the patient
is now incompetent to make valid decisions. To avoid the
loss, the patient's parents must be allowed to exercise this
2. Cf In re Quinlan, 70 NJ. 10, 41-42, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (1976) (Although Karen Ann
Quinlan was comatose and therefore incompetent, her family was allowed to exercise her
right to refuse medical treatment.). See infra note 6.
3. Cf. Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 431, 497 N.E.2d 626,
634 (1986) (guardian authorized to remove incompetent from hospital to care of other
physicians who would honor patient's wishes. 1d). See also infra note 7.
4. Cf. Gardner, 534 A.2d at 955-56.
5. Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at 216-18, 741 P.2d at 685; In re Conroy, 98 NJ. at 369, 486
A.2d at 1226.
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authority.6 The Massachusetts Supreme Court held that the

state must afford to incompetent persons "the same panoply
of rights and choices it recognizes in competent persons."'
Finally, the Maine Supreme Court held that withdrawing food
and water from a patient did not constitute suicide because

there was no specific intent to die.8 This is not meant to
single out these particular courts because these principles have
been adopted by other courts when faced with whether to
terminate treatment for an incompetent patient. However,
there seems to be developing a judicial consensus that these
principles represent an appropriate framework within which to
decide these admittedly difficult and sensitive cases.

If the fictional decisions had been reached, it is quite
likely that a large portion of the legal community would agree
that the decisions were wrong. At a minimum, such decisions
would be quite controversial for their legal reasoning alone,

quite apart from the results reached. The failure to provide
a treatment which would sustain the life of a patient is clearly

the proximate cause of his death. When a doctor deliberately
fails to so treat a patient, we must conclude that the doctor

intended the natural and foreseeable consequences of that
action, death. Most importantly, may we determine what duty
is owed to an incompetent person by a party who, a priori or
6. In re Quinlan, 70 NJ. at 41-42, 355 A.2d at 664 (21 year old woman in persistent
vegetative state kept alive on a respirator. Supreme Court of New Jersey held patient's right
to privacy extended to refusing medical treatment, and that her father, as guardian, could
exercise that right for her. Id). See generally Weinberg, Whose Right is it Anyway?
Individualism, Community, and the Right to Die: A Commentary on the New Jersey Eerience,
40 HASnNGS LJ. 119 (1988).
7. Brophy, 398 Mass. at 431, 497 N.E.2d at 634. (Young fireman suffered brain
anuerism resulting in inability to eat or chew. A Gastric tube was inserted in his stomach,
but his wife and family wanted it removed. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
held that although the hospital had a right to refuse to remove the tube, the family had the
right to remove the patient to another hospital that would carry out its wishes. kL). See
generally Favour, A Physician's Comments Prompted by the Massachusetts Brophy Case, 7 PROB.
LJ.265 (1987).
8. Gardner, 534 A.2d at 955-56 (23 year old male fell from a pickup truck. He had
been in a persistant vegetative state for two years and was kept alive by means of a nasogastric tube. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held that there was "clear and convincing
evidence" that the incompetent had expressed, prior to his incompetency, a desire not to be
kept alive by arificial means and, therefore, the tube could be removed. id).
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by proxy, exercises the incompetent person's rights. Yet these
principles have been adopted and later applied by other courts
with little or no comment in cases in which the issue is the
termination of life-sustaining treatment for incompetent
patients.9 Why have courts been so willing to adopt in this
particular context legal principles they would likely find highly
questionable in any other context? There is no easy answer
to the motivation behind these decisions and it would probably
be fruitless to speculate. We can, however, deal with the
reality of these decisions and, more particularly, with how,
rather than why, they have been reached."
The two questions which most immediately spring to
mind from these decisions are: (1) whether they represent the
adoption of new principles which will be applicable in other
contexts or (2) whether they represent an "adhoc nullification"
of normal rules only in cases of termination of life-sustaining
treatment." Neither possibility is particularly attractive.
If cases involving termination of life-sustaining treatment
for incompetent patients are in fact an aberration, then we
must conclude that the decisions are totally result oriented.
That fact alone seriously questions the wisdom of those results.
Behind the evolutionary development of case law and the
statutory enactments of legislative bodies is a presumption that
we, as a society, are acting in a wise and prudent manner.
When a court discards those doctrines, it similarly discards the
presumed wisdom which is their foundation. In addressing the
constitutionality of capital punishment for a fifteen year old,
a plurality of the United States Supreme Court in Thompson
9. See supra notes 1-8.
10. See generally Opperman, Termination of Life-Sustaining Treatment: Who and How to
Decide?, 33 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 469 (1988).

11. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 814 (1985) (Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist dissenting) ("[no legal rule or doctrine
is safe from ad hoc nullification . . . when an occasion for its application arises in a case
involving state regulation of abortion." Id).
12. 12.5 3 R. Pound, JURISPRUDENCE§ 96 (1959).
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v. Oklahoma 3 noted that the many statutes states have
enacted pertaining to children reflect basic assumptions about
their ability to act rationally in their own behalf. According
to the plurality, it would be ironic if those same assumptions
"were suddenly unavailable in determining whether it is cruel
and unusual to treat children the same as adults for purposes
of inflicting capital punishment."'4 The plurality, therefore,
found consistency in the application of those assumptions to
be a virtue in deciding the particular case before it."
Similar assumptions, however, are also made with
regard to the "insane, and those who are irreversibly ill with
In addressing the needs of
loss of brain function."' 6
incompetent persons, states have established systems of
statutory guardianships as an exercise of their parens patriae
power to provide for those who are unable to care for
themselves. 7 It has been recognized by both state and federal
courts that a statutory guardian is an officer of the court who
is always under the court's control and subject to its directions
as to the person of the ward.' A state's parenspatriae power
is beneficent 9 and we should not readily or arbitrarily discard
the assumptions behind the manner in which that power is
exercised on behalf of incompetent persons.
It is undeniable that it is "the essence of federalism that
states must be free to develop a variety of solutions to
problems and not be forced into a common, uniform mold."'
13.

108 S.Ct. 2687, 2693 n.23 (1988) (where the court held that the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments prohibited execution of a fifteen year old defendant convicted of
first-degree murder. Id).

14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979).
18. Inre Terwillinger, 304 Pa. Super. 553, 559-60, 450 A.2d 1376, 1380 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1982); Oyama v. State of California, 332 U.S. 269 (1948); Christoffel v. E.F. Hutton & Co.,
Inc., 588 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1978); Martineau v. City of St. Paul, 172 F.2d 777 (8th Cir.
1949).
19. The Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United
States, 136 U.S. 1, 57 (1890).
20. Addington, 441 U.S. at 431.
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Substantive and procedural standards regarding incompetents
and guardianships may vary from state to state, as they might
in any other area. Thus, the principles which have been
applied in cases regarding termination of life-sustaining
treatment may find their way into other areas of the law. For
instance, New Jersey has also held that a guardian is merely
acting to protect a ward's rights when the proposed action is
sterilization of the incompetent ward."1 Certainly, cases
dealing with termination of medical treatment do not offer any
principled basis upon which application of the principles could
be restricted to the particular subject matter. Thus, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court has broadly stated that: "[t]o
protect the incompetent person within its power, the State
must recognize the dignity and worth of such a person and
afford to that person the same panoply of rights and choices
it recognizes in competent persons."' Given the inevitability
that these principles will be extended, we cannot avoid asking
whether the assumptions which underlie these decisions
constitute a wise and sound exercise of the state's parens
patriae power.
Certain basic assumptions underlie the decisions to
allow termination of life-sustaining treatment for incompetent
patients. Virtually without exception the courts conclude that
the personal rights of the patient to choose or decide are at
stake, despite the fact that these patients are admittedly
incompetent to make any choice, informed or not.' Second,
these courts assume that the inability of the incompetent
patient to exercise the right is an intolerable situation which
the state is required to overcome."4 In other words, they hold
21. In re Grady, 85 NJ. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981) (parents of noninstitutionalized
daughter afflicted with Down's Syndrome sought appointment of special guardian authorized

to consent to sterilization of daughter by tubal ligation. Id).
22. Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 431, 497 N.E.2d 626, 634
(1986).
23. Id. In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 951-52 (Me. 1987).
24. In re Quinlan, 70 NJ. 10, 41, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (1976). Brophy, 398 Mass. at 431,
497 N.E.2d at 634-35.
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that to avoid destruction of the right, a state must allow the
decision to be made even when there had been no express
directives from the patient.' These assumptions, however, are
not only questionable, but dangerous.
First, the right to make medical treatment decisions,
like the right of privacy, is a right to choose. It can only
belong to a person who is competent to exercise that right.'
The seminal case of In re Quinlan' reflects "a right of privacy
gone wild."' Although the decision was based upon Karen
Quinlan's personal right of choice, there was little, if any, basis
upon which one could determine what her choice would be:
Our affirmation of Karen's independent right of
choice, however, would ordinarily be based upon
her competency to assert it. The sad truth,
however, is that she is grossly incompetent and
we cannot discern her supposed choice based on
the testimony of her previous conversations with
friends, where such testimony is without sufficient
probative weight.'
Of course, the New Jersey Supreme Court later allowed the
consideration of prior statements as a basis for decision but as
discussed, that presents problems of its own.'
It cannot be denied that incompetent persons retain
constitutional rights.
For instance, they could not be
25. L.

TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrIImONAL LAW 1368 (2d ed. 1988).
26. Note, The Refusal Of Life-Saving Medical Treatment vs. The State's Interest In The
Preservation Of Life: A Clarification Of The Interest At Stake, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 85, 100
(1980).
27. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 10, 355 A.2d at 647 (1976).

28. Note, Due Process Privacy And The Path Of Progress, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 469, 517.
29. Quinlan, 70 NJ. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664 (citing the lower court's opinion, 137 NJ.
Super. 227, 260 (Ch. Div. 1975)).
30. In re Peter, 108 NJ. 365, 378-79, 529 A.2d 419, 426-27 (1987).
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institutionalized without due process of law." However, a
fundamental distinction must be drawn between rights which
may be possessed passively and those which require
affirmative exercise. Perhaps part of the analytical problem
could be alleviated by the adoption of different terms. Thus,
passive protections, such as procedural due process or equal
protection, could be termed rights and matters of choice could
be termed freedoms.3" However, concluding that a freedom
to choose survives incompetency is a legal fiction at best.3
Given the fact that these patients are irreversibly
comatose or in a chronic vegetative state,
attributing "rights" to these patients at all is
somewhat problematic. .

.

. To be sure, these

patients are not "dead" in most of the
increasingly multiple senses of the term, but the
task of giving content to the notion that they
have rights in the face of the recognition that
they could make no decisions about how to
exercise any such rights remains a difficult one. 4
The matter was eloquently summarized by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in its response to the opinion of the New
Jersey Supreme Court in In re Grady,35 applying a right of
personal choice to the decision to sterilize an incompetent.
31. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) (patient's constitutional right to
liberty violated when state involuntarily commited to mental hospital nondangerous individual

who was capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself.); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584,
600, 606 (1979) (minor children's constituional right to liberty not violated by law permitting
voluntary admission of children to mental hospital by parents or guardians, but since risk of
error is inherent in such parental decision, some kind of inquiry should be made by a neutral
factfinder to determine whether statutory requirements for admission are satisfied.).
32. Garvey, Freedom And Choice In Constitutional Law, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1756 (1981).
33. In re Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 208, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 854 (Cal. Ct. App.
6th Dist. 1988).

34. L.

TRIBE,

supra note 25, at 1368 n.25.

35. 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981).
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We find it somewhat too facile when discussing
the right of privacy, which by definition
necessarily refers to the person involved, to find
that there is a genuine choice when that choice
cannot be personally exercisable. It is indeed
true that in Grady there was a decision, but it
was not the decision of Lee Ann Grady pursuant
to her right of privacy. We believe it somewhat
inconsistent for the New Jersey court to equate
in a single breath "the choice made in her
behalf' and "providing her with a choice"
The fault we find in the New Jersey case
is in the ratio decidendi of first concluding,
correctly we believe, that the right to sterilization
is a personal choice, but then equating a decision
made by others with the choice of the person to
be sterilized. It clearly is not a personal choice,
and no amount of legal legerdemain can make
it so.'

To continue to deal with these cases in terms of rights
of the incompentent patient constitutes a dangerous illusion.
The use of the term "right to die" fosters the belief "[t]hat
when society makes significant and painfully difficult decisions
about life and death, we are maiking no decision at all, but
merely deferring to individual autonomy."37 In short, in any
case which does not involve a competent patient we must
"abandon the language of individual rigths and accept the
reality of the situation."'
The reality of the situation is simply that a decision is
being made for the incompetent patient and not by the
36.

In re Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 566, 307 N.W.2d 881, 893 (1981) (citation

ommitted) (dismissal of guardian's petition seeking court approval for their consent to surgical
sterilization of their severely retarded adult daughter).
37. Beschle, Autonomous Decision Making And Social Choice: Eamining The "Right To
Die," 77 Ky. LJ. 319, 322 (1988).
38. Id. at 360.
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incompetent patient. Even in instances where a court
concludes that a guardian has the right to make that choice,
it must be recognized that that decision is not based upon the
personal rights of the patient.39
Once this reality is
acknowledged, we begin to be on more familiar terrain:
normal guardianship principles. We can recognize now that
there are two fundamental questions which are presented.
First, who is to make a decision on behalf of the incompetent
person and upon what basis should that person act. The
answers to such questions may vary from state to state, but
the analysis will invoke vastly different legal principles than
would cases in which a state seeks to limit or override a
personal choice of a fully competent person.
Despite the rhetoric in these cases concerning individual
rights, many of these courts intuitively recognize this point.
For instance, the New Jersey Supreme Court imposed a
requirement of independent confirmation by a hospital
prognosis committee.' However, assuming that the right to
refuse medical treatment is of constitutional magnitude, like
the right to choose an abortion,' a requirement of
independent confirmation by hospital commission would
infringe that right. 2 However, when an individual's personal
right of choice is not at stake, a requirement of independent
confirmation is a perfectly acceptable, and perhaps
constitutionally required, protection against arbitrary state
action.43 Thus, due process requires independent medical
confirmation regarding a parental decision to institutionalize
their minor child.'M There must be some level of protection
39. In re Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 212, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 857-58 (Cal. Ct.
App. 6th Dist. 1988).
40. In re Jobes, 108 NJ. 394, 421-22, 529 A2d 434, 468 (1987). See generally
McElvaine, Withholding and Withdrawing Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment: Procedures for
Subjective and Objective Surrogate Decision Making in In re Jobes, In re Peter and In re Farrell,
19 RWriGERS L.J. 1029 (1988).
41. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)..
42. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 198 (1973).
43. See generally, In re Jobes, 108 NJ. at 394, 529 A.2d at 434; Doe, 410 U.S. at 179.
44. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1978).
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against arbitrary action in this category of cases as well
because states are not being asked to maintain neutrality on
the question of whether life-sustaining treatment should be
withdrawn for incompetent patients. Instead, they are being
asked to confer this life-and-death power upon third persons.
The assumption that a state is obligated to delegate this
right so that it may not be lost is simply incorrect, at least
insofar as the federal Constitution is concerned. A patient's
incompetency is simply a naturally occurring obstacle to the
exercise of the patient's rights. It is not a state imposed
forfeiture thereof. A state, however, is not constitutionally
compelled to take steps to overcome that obstacle, even when
the failure to do so prevents a person from exercising a liberty
interest. "[A]lthough government may not place obstacles in
the path of a woman's exercise of her freedom of choice, it
need not remove those not of its own creation."45
Quite apart from whether this particular delegation of
authority is required, a failure to recognize the fundamental
difference between the right of patient to choose and the
authority of a surrogate to choose for the patient can only
"lead to poorly reasoned decisions."' When viewed from the
perspective of protection of the incompetent patient, the
decision of many of these courts to limit the judicial role is
quite troubling because so few constraints are placed upon the
surrogate's authority. As stated by the New Jersey Supreme
Court "[w]e emphasize that in this as in every case, the
ultimate decision is not for the Court. The decision is
primarily that of the patient, competent or incompetent, and
the patient's family or guardian and physician. 7
If a parental decision to institutionalize a minor child
contains such a risk of error that there should be a neutral
45. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980).

46. 2 R.
(1986).

ROTUNDA,

J.

NOWAK, & YOUNG, TREATiSE ON CONSTIUTIONAL LAW

47. In re Peter, 108 NJ.365, 385, 529 A.2d 419, 430 (1987).
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decision-maker, ' why is the risk of error in a familial decision
to terminate life-sustaining treatment not great enough to
justify or require judicial intervention? The doctrine of thirdparty consent, particularly without court supervision, may
actually authorize the third party to consent to an action that
would be forbidden to the state itself.49
[Third-party] type of consent is really nothing
short of an extended conceit on the proposition
of voluntariness. It is a fiction which authorizes
the state to intervene because a party other than
the subject provides the green light. . .

.

By

characterizing the transaction as "consensual"
rather than "compulsory," third-party consent
allows the truly involuntary to be declared
voluntary, thus by-passing constitutional, ethical,
and moral questions, and avoiding the violation
of taboos. Third-party consent is a miraculous
creation of the law -- adroit, flexible, and useful

in covering the unseemly reality of conflict with
a patina of cooperation."
The doctrine of third-party consent, without court oversight, is
simply "inadquate to protect" the fundamental rights of the
incompetent."'
. A point often overlooked by many courts is that more
than the incompetent's asserted right to refuse medical
treatment is at stake in these cases. The withdrawal of
treatment is not only the exercise of a purported liberty
interest, but the waiver of the patient's right to life. The basis
upon which many of these courts have found the implicit
48. Parham, 442 U.S. at 584.
49. Price, Sterilization, State Action, And The Concept Of Consent, 1 LAw &
PSYCHOLOGY REV. 57, 78 (1975).
50. Id. at 58.
51. Conservatorship of Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d 143, 191, 707 P.2d 760, 793, 219 Cal.
Rptr. 387, 420 (1985) (Chief Justice Bird dissenting).
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waiver of such a fundamental right is tenuous at best. 2 The
evidence offered in many cases to indicate what choice an
incompetent patient would have made is often woefully
inadequate to constitute the "intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right."53 For instance, the statements
of Nancy Jobes were "remote, general, spontaneous, and made
in casual circumstances."" The idea that a person can either
exercise or waive a fundamental constitutional or common law
right "unintentionally through informal statements years in
advance" is "dangerously unpredictable"" and has not been
applied in any cases other than termination of treatment. '
However, the lack of specific directives from the patient
prior to incompetency does not remove the need to make a
decision on the patient's behalf. Decisions will continue to
have to be made and society must have some articulable basis
upon which to do so. Here again, many courts falter because
any such decision cannot be based upon an assessment of the
quatlity or worth of the patient's life. According to the New
Jersey Supreme Court "[w]e do not believe that it would be
appropriate for a court to designate a person with the
authority to determine that someone else's life is not worth
living simply because, to that person, the patient's "quality of
life" or value to society seems negligible."" However, only
two years later, the same court specifically approved different
tests for making termination of treatment decisions, depending
52. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (petitioner convicted without counsel;
Court held that there was insufficient proof to show that petitioner waived this fundamental
right to counsel.).
53. See id. at 464-65.
54. In re Jobes, 108 NJ. 394, 412, 529 A.2d 434, 443 (1987).
55. In re Drabick, 200 Cal App. 3d 185, 211, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 856 (Cal. Ct. App.
6th Dist. 1988).
56. Id. The California Court of Appeals pointed out that a conservator's rights and
authority over medical decisions were exclusive. Id For other cases involving questions
involving termination of treatment, see Matter of Quinlan, 70 NJ. 10, 335 A.2d 647 (1976);
and Matter of Beth Israel Medical Center, 136 Misc.2d 931, 519 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1987).
57. Matter of Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 367, 486 A.2d 1209, 1233 (1985).
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upon whether the patient is in a persistent vegetative state."
In devising a test for vegetative state patients which made it
easier to decide to terminate treatment, the court held: "[I]ifeexpectancy analyses assume that there are at least some
benefits to be derived from the continued sustenance of an
incompetent patient. That assumption, which is usually valid
. . . is not appropriate in the case of persistently vegetative
patients . . . " "' This is nothing less than a court's value

judgment that the life of a vegetative state patient is not
worthy of the same degree of protection as some other class
of incompetent patient. Having courts focus on a patient's
prognosis in determining whether a patient's desire to refuse
treatment should be effectuated raises the specter of the worst
kind of state paternalism: having the state regularly make
judgments about the value of a life.
This implicit value judgment regarding the worth of the
patient's life may explain why courts are so quick to deviate
from or ignore generally accepted legal principles. In other
words, the judges apparently agree with the purported decision
of the incompetent patient and, therefore, look for a means
to effect it. ' However, this process says more about the
values and judgments of the judges involved than it does a
about the patient's. Because in the final analysis the patient's
wishes are unknown and unknowable, society must tread
carefully in formulating a basis upon which these treatment
decisions can be made. To avoid even an implicit state
judgment on the value of an incompetent's life, a state should
establish objective factors which should be considered when
making treatment decisions on behalf of such persons. The
application of explicit, objective standards affords the best
protection against possible arbitrary and discriminatory
58. In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 529 A2d 419 (1987).
59. Id at 374-75, 529 A.2d at 424.
60. See, e.g., Peter, 108 N.J. at 365, 529"A.2d at 419; Superintendent of Belchertown
State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
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actions.6
Thus, any system of decision-making on behalf of
incompetent persons should include significant judicial
oversight, if not outright judicial decision-making. This was
the approach taken by the Missouri Supreme Court in Cruzan
v. Harmon.62 The court held that under Missouri law a
guardian's statutory duty was to assure that the ward received
medical care.' Any deviation from this statutory duty could
only be approved by a court.' This result was consistent with
other Missouri provisions which required judicial approval of
decisions of less significance than terminating life-sustaining
treatment: Commitment to a mental institution, psychosurgery
and electroshock therapy.'
Similarly, some states require
judicial approval, rather than a guardian's, prior to sterilization
of a ward of the court.' Ironically, the District Court of
Connecticut disagreed with the Quinlan rationale, although
both cases relied upon the United States Supreme Court
privacy decisons: parents may neither validly consent to nor
veto sterilization of their minor child.67
Even in matters in which a substantive constitutional
right is at stake, such as abortion, judicial decision-making has
been approved, at least in instances where the person is not
able to make a valid decision.'
Apart from being
constitutionally permissible, sound policy would also appear to
call for a stronger judicial role. Because of the possible,
unconscious reliance upon personal motives, it is by no means
sure that parents or family members would be the most
61. See In re Westchester County Med. Ctr., 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531 N.E.2d 607, 534
N.Y.S.2d 886 (1988).

62. 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988).
63. Id at 424.
64.
65.
66.
649, 263
67.

Id. at 425.
See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 475.121-23 (Vernon 1956 & Supp. 1990).
In re Penny, 120 N.H. 269, 414 A.2d 541 (N.H. 1980); In re Johnson, 45 N.C. App.
S.E.2d 805 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980).
Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp. 361, 371 (D. Conn. 1978).

68. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
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appropriate persons to make the sugnificant life-and-death
decisions which are at stake in these cases.'
In considering prior statements or directives of a
patient, the court should insist upon reliable evidence "that the
patient had a firm and settled commitment to the termination
of life supports under the circumstances like those
presented."' A decision to refuse life-sustaining treatment
should be as informed as a decision to accept treatment. 71 In
addressing both the exercise of a right to refuse treatment, as
well as the waiver of something as fundamental as the right to
life, courts should not stray too far from normal waiver
doctrines. They should not, for instance, assume what a
patient may have wanted.'
Assessing the evidence of a
patient's wishes which is typically available is not an easy task.
Most persons have made statements, at one time or another,
which might later be argued to evince an intent to refuse
treatment.'
Yet it is a task which must be undertaken
because whatever system of decisionmaking is adopted "must
also provide shelter for those who would choose to live--if able
to choose--despite the inconvenience that choice might cause
others. 74
Finally, in assessing an incompetent patient's best
interests, a state should not treat different forms of proposed
treatment identically. Presumably a competent patient would
not do so when making his own decision and neither should
a court on making the decision on behalf of an incompetent
patient. Therefore, a court should consider whether the
treatment may be characterized as ordinary or extraordinary,
whether the treatment will have its desired effect even if that
69. See Parham v. JR., 442 U.S. 584, 632 (1979); In the Matter of the Guardianship
of Eberhardy, 307 N.W.2d 881, 897 (Wis. 1981).
70. In re O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531, 531 N.E.2d 607, 613, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886, 892
(1988).
71. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 417 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
72. O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d at 529-30, 531 N.E.2d at 613-15, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 891-92.
73. Id. at 532-33, 531 N.E.2d at 614, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 893.
74. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 419.
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effect is not to cure totally, and whether it presents any
substantial risks to the patient. The court might also consider
whether an incompetent patient has been diagnosed as being
terminally ill.75
CONCLUSION

Far too many cases dealing with the termination of lifesustaining treatment for incompetent patients have resulted in
decisions based upon questionable legal fictions or distortions
of normal prinicples which most courts would not tolerate in
a case dealing with any other subject matter.
The
fundamental difficulty with the cases is that they have gotten
too wrapped up in the rhetoric of individual rights and lost
sight of the fact that what really is called for is a decision
which will adequately protect all of the rights of the
incompetent patients, not just the asserted right to refuse
medical treatment. This is a traditional sort of inquiry that
courts are often called upon to make. The assumptions that
courts and legislatures make when acting on behalf of
incompetent persons in other areas of the law should not
suddenly become irrelevant when the question is withdrawal
of life-sustaining treatment. To do so neither furthers any
personal rights of choice of the incompetent patient, nor
provides adequate protection against the incompetent person's
right to life.
75. Id

